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Article 3

THE PLIGHT OF THE MINORITY MOTORIST
CAROL M. BAST*

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 24, 1990, Selena Washington and her cousin were traveling
on Interstate 95 through Volusia County, Florida. 1 At 3:15 a.m., a

Volusia County Sheriff's officer, a member of the Volusia County
Selective Enforcement Team, stopped Ms. Washington for driving seven

miles over the speed limit. The officer gave Ms. Washington a warning
and asked permission to search her car. After Ms. Washington consented,

the officer searched the car and found $19,000 in cash. Ms. Washington
explained that her Charleston, South Carolina, home had been damaged
by Hurricane Hugo. Because the cost of building materials needed to
repair her home had skyrocketed in South Carolina, Ms. Washington said,
she was traveling to Miami to purchase the materials. The officer seized

Ms. Washington's $19,000, claiming it was "drug money."

Ms. Washington, a forty-three-year-old African-American who had no
criminal history, hired an attorney to get her money back. She also

provided canceled checks and sworn affidavits to verify that her cash was
not "drug money." The paperwork showed that the cash was from loans

she obtained from a friend and two relatives while she was waiting for an
insurance settlement for property damaged by Hurricane Hugo. Volusia

County gave her the option of having $15,000 of the $19,000 returned to
her or challenging the forfeiture in court. Because Florida law at the time
* Assistant Professor, Department of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies of the
University of Central Florida; J.D., 1982, New York Law School.
1. Selena Washington's ordeal was reported in several newspaper articles. See Jeff
Brazil & Steve Berry, Deputies Take $19,000 and Leave a Woman in Despair,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 14, 1992, at A-16 [hereinafter Brazil & Berry, Deputies Take
$19,000]; see also Steve Berry, Woman Who Sued Vogel isFound, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
July 22, 1993, at B-4; Steve Berry, Vogel Faces Bias Suit over Cash Seizures, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, June 18, 1993, at B-i, B-4; Jeff Brazil, Congressman: Vogel's 1-95
Forfeitures 'Tantamount to Extortion', ORLANDO SENTINEL, June23, 1993, at A-i, A-6
[hereinafter Brazil, Congressman]; Jeff Brazil, 'Legalized Theft' or Crime-Fighting
Tool?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 20, 1993, at B-i, B-5 [hereinafter Brazil, Legalized
Theft]; Steve Berry & Jeff Brazil, FBI to Look at Vogel's 1-95 Policy, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 16, 1993, at A-i, A-4 [hereinafter Berry & Brazil, FBI]; Blake
Fontenay, Vogel Lawsuit Might Mean a Tax Increase, ORLANDO SENTNEL, Oct. 8,
1993, at B-3 [hereinafter Fontenay, Tax Increase];Blake Fontenay, Volusia Fears Costs
for Cash-Seizure Suit, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 7, 1993, at B-i, B-4 [hereinafter
Fontenay, Volusia FearsCosts].
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gave her little chance of recovering her costs and attorneys fees, 2 her
attorney advised her that it would be less expensive to accept the county's
offer than to pay the expenses involved in contesting the seizure in Florida
state courts.'
Accepting the advice, she signed an agreement with
Volusia County,5 receiving $15,000 of the $19,000 taken, 4 and paid her
attorney $1000.
Selena Washington's story is merely one example of the abusive

application of civil asset forefeiture. In fact, the Volusia County Sheriff's
Office has repeatedly used the Florida forfeiture statutes' to seize cash
from apparently innocent 1-95 minority motorists, such as Selena
Washington. 7 Unfortunately, the potential for abuse is not limited to local
2. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 932.701-932.704 (West 1985) (containing no provision
for the award of attorney's fees). The Legislature has enacted a provision allowing
claimants who prevail to receive attorney's fees. This statute now states:
When the claimant prevails, the court may, in its discretion, award
reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the claimant at the close of forfeiture
proceedings and any appeal if the court finds that the seizing agency has not
proceeded in good faith or that the seizing agency's action which precipitated
the forfeiture proceedings or appeal was a gross abuse of the agency's
discretion.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.704(10) (West Supp. 1995); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
57.105(1) (West 1994) (providing attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a civil action
only when "there [is] a complete absenceof ajusticiable issue of either law or fact raised
by the complaint or defense of the losing party .... ") (emphasis added).
3. See Brazil & Berry, Deputies Take $19,000, supra note 1, at A-16.
4. See Defendant's Answer and Affirmative Defenses to First Amended Complaint,
Exhibit 1, Florida State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Vogel, No. 93-482-CIVORL-22 (M.D. Fla. filed June 18, 1993). For the text of the agreement, see infra note
231.
5. See Brazil & Berry, Deputies Take $19,000, supra note 1, at A-16.
6. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 932.701-932.707 (West
1985 & Supp. 1995).
7. On May 2, 1991, a Volusia County Sheriff's deputy stopped Jose Raposa and
seized $19,000. See Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Tainted Cash or Easy Money?,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 14, 1992, at A-1, A-16 [hereinafter Brazil & Berry, Tainted
Cash]. The deputy said he was suspicious of Mr. Raposa because Mr. Raposa appeared
very nervous and the deputy spotted a small amount of marijuana in the car ashtray. Id.
Mr. Raposa said the cash was from a home equity loan and he was taking it to Miami
to purchase antique cars. Id. He had seen the cars in a car trader magazine and was
carrying cash because he understood that car dealers require cash. Id. Six months later,
Mr. Raposa agreed to a settlement in which the Volusia County Sheriff's Office gave
Mr. Raposa back 75% of the money seized, of which Mr. Raposa paid his attorney
$1000. Id.
On April 15, 1991, a Volusia County Sheriff's deputy seized $38,923 from Edwin
Johnson, an African-American, after Mr. Johnson was stopped on 1-95 for failure to
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law enforcement. Federal authorities also are susceptible to similar
misapplications because the same temptation for cash seizure is present
under the federal Controlled Substances Act.' Given the possibility of
signal when changing lanes. See Steve Berry & Jeff Brazil, 'I Could Win the Battle but
Lose the War', ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 15, 1992, at A-6. The deputy said he was
suspicious of Mr. Johnson because Mr. Johnson was nervous, did not have enough
luggage, and did not know the exact dollar amount of the cash he was carrying. Id. Mr.
Johnson said the money was the profit from two businesses Mr. Johnson had owned and
he was carrying cash because he had previously had money garnished. Id. Six months
later, Mr. Johnson agreed to a settlement in which the Volusia County Sheriff's Office
returned him all but $10,000 of the money seized, of which Mr. Johnson paid his
attorney approximately one-third. id.
On February 4, 1991, a Volusia County Sheriff's deputy stopped Jorge Nater on I95 for following too closely, a traffic violation. See Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, 'How
Could They Say They TreatedMe Fairly?',ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 14, 1992, at A-17.
The deputy seized $36,990 from Mr. Nater, a citizen of Puerto Rico. Id. The deputy
said that he was suspicious of Mr. Nater because Mr. Nater was very nervous and had
to look up the address of his destination. Id. Mr. Nater explained that he had sold an
apartment complex in Puerto Rico a few days earlier and was headed to Pompano Beach
with the money to buy a home near his four sons. Id. A hidden microphone recorded
Mr. Nater telling his traveling companion that if they were allowed to leave with the
money they should hide it "in a tire." Id. Nine months later, Mr. Nater agreed to a
settlement in which the Volusia County Sheriff's Office returned all but $6000 of the
amount seized, of which Mr. Nater paid his attorney approximately one-fourth. Id.
Also on February 4, 1991, a Volusia County Sheriff's deputy stopped Earl Fields,
an African-American, and seized $37,970. See Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Lottery
Winner's Luck Runs out with Deputy's $37,970 Haul, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 16,
1992, at A-4 [hereinafter Brazil & Berry, Lottery Winner's Luck Runs Out]. The deputy
said he was suspicious of Mr. Fields because Mr. Fields was very nervous and evasive,
and his money was wrapped in rubber bands. Id. The Volusia County Sheriffs Office
refused to return the cash even though Mr. Fields claimed the cash was from lottery
winnings and produced "a canceled check signed by then-Lottery Commissioner Rebecca
Paul for $213,698.48." Id. Mr. Fields' jury trial to contest the forfeiture was about to
begin when Mr. Fields decided to accept a settlement instead. Id. When jury selection
began, Mr. Fields got 'cold feet,' his attorney said, because every juror was white. Id.
The Volusia County Sheriffs Office kept $14,970, and Mr. Fields got $23,000, of which
he paid his attorney $8000. Id.
In March 1990, a Volusia County Sheriff's deputy stopped Joseph Kea, a 20-yearold African-American, for driving six miles above the speed limit and seized $3989 in
cash. See Brazil & Berry, Tainted Cash, at A-16. The deputy said he was suspicious
of Mr. Kea because Mr. Kea was very nervous, had no luggage with him, had his money
in groups of $100, and wore a wrinkled Navy uniform and scuffed shoes. Id. Eight
months later, Mr. Kea agreed to a settlement in which he got back all but $1000, of
which he paid his attorney approximately one-fourth. Id.
8. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1242, 1276 (1970) (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see Brazil, Legalized Theft, supra note 1, at
B-i, B-5 (indicating that federal agencies have "pocketed" $2.8 billion since 1985).
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abuse, there remains one critical question: What constitutional protection
does an innocent minority motorist, who happens to be carrying cash,
have against the immense power of law enforcement agencies?
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
federal government from depriving an individual of property without due

process of law.9 The Fourteenth Amendment makes that due process
guarantee applicable against state
action and prohibits a state from denying
1
"equal protection of the laws." " Guided by these amendments, the role
of the courts has been to safeguard the individual's constitutional rights by

reviewing allegedly unconstitutional actions of public officials.11

In

Tumey v. Ohio12 and Ward v. Monroeville, 3 the Supreme Court held
that the defendants' due process right had been violated because of the

"possible temptation" of the mayor/judge to convict when pecuniary

benefits would flow from the conviction."
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be deprived of... life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .. ").
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall ... deprive any person of...
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.").
11. Edward D. Re, Due Process, Judicial Review, and the Rights of the Individual,
39 CLEV. ST. L. Rv. 1 (1991). The author writes:
From the town or village clerk, to the city fire or housing inspector, to the.
. .many federal independent regulatory commissions, it is clear that these
agencies are the government.. . . The ever-recurring question pertains to the
individual who feels aggrieved because the very agency that was established
to assure rights granted by law, has in fact denied the individual those rights
that were guaranteed by the law.
Id. at 2. The author continues:
[U]nder our Constitutional system, it is now basic that the courts may pass
upon the constitutionality of statutes, and their meaning when they are applied
to specific cases. As a consequence, it is also for the courts to say if any
person has been deprived of any rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the
laws enacted thereunder. Hence, any person who alleges a deprivation of due
process or equal protection of the law may resort to the Courts for vindication
of these constitutionally protected rights.
Id. at 5.
12. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
13. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
14. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 514-15. In Tumey, the Supreme Court had to decide:
whether certain statutes of Ohio, in providing for the trial by the mayor of a
village of one accused of violating the Prohibition Act of the State, deprive the
accused of due process of law and violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, because of the pecuniary and other interest which those
statutes give the mayor in the result of the trial.
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The pecuniary benefits flowing to law enforcement officers under state
and federal forfeiture statutes are similar to those flowing to the
mayor/judge in Ward. Like the officials in Ward, police departments are

allowed to retain a portion of the proceeds seized through asset
forfeiture. 15 The ability to share the proceeds of civil forfeitures may

create an incentive for police officers to overzealously and, perhaps,

unconstitutionally apply local seizure laws. Although judges are aware of
this "possible temptation," federal and Florida courts seem unwilling to
Until the
afford minority motorists any preseizure protection.1 6
legislative branch amends the forfeiture statutes to better protect the
innocent motorist who chooses to travel with large amounts of cash,

minority motorists like Selena Washington are protected only by adverse
publicity 7 and lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.18
Id.

Between May 11 and December 31, 1923, the village court collected "upwards of
$20,000, from which the state received $8992.50." Id. at 521. Of the amount retained
by the village, portions went to general uses, to the village safety fund, and to pay
salaries and costs. During that period the mayor received $696.35 in addition to his
regular salary. Id. at 521-22. In 1923 dollars, these were significant amounts. The
Court held that the Ohio statutes violated the criminal defendant's due process rights
because they gave the judge "a direct, personal, pecuniary interest in convicting the
defendant." Id. at 523. The Court found that the temptation was twofold. Fines obtained
for convictions would increase the mayor's compensation. The fines would also add to
the village treasury and thus ease the mayor's responsibility for the financial condition
of the village. Id. at 532-33. The test to determine the constitutionality of the statutes
was whether the trial court procedure "would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the
accused." Id. at 532.
In Ward, the Supreme Court was faced with an analogous situation. Ward had
claimed "that trial before a mayor who also had responsiblities for revenue production
and law enforcement denied him a trial before a disinterested and impartial judicial
officer as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ward,
409 U.S. at 58. From 1964 through 1968, the money collected by the mayor of
Monroeville in his court amounted to between one-third to one-half of total village
revenues for those years. Id. The village argued that "unfairness" at trial could be
corrected on appeal. The Court applied the "possible temptation test" from Tumey and
held that when the defendant was not guaranteed due process at the trial court, that
procedure was not "constitutionally acceptable." Id. at 61-62.
15. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
932.704(1) (West Supp. 1995).
16. See infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part IV.C.
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This article reviews proposed legislative changes to forfeiture statutes,
the present status of case law concerning cash seizures from motorists, and
other avenues of relief available to the minority motorist. Part I[ discusses
Florida and federal forfeiture statutes currently in effect and proposed
changes to the forfeiture statutes. 19 Part III explains the Supreme Court's
current stance toward preseizure due process protection for cash-carrying
motorists.' Specifically, it analyzes how such protections are affected
by United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,21 United States v. Sokolow,
United States v. $8850,' and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co.' Part IV examines cases involving Sheriff Robert Vogel and the
effect adverse publicity has had on his Selective Enforcement Team
operations.' Part V reviews § 1983 lawsuits filed by minority motorists
contesting the constitutionality of cash seizures.' The article concludes
that, although the immediate solution to the problem faced by the minority
motorist may be adverse publicity and class action lawsuits under § 1983,
the best remedy lies with appropriately drafted legislation.
I.

FEDERAL AND STATE FORFEITURE STATUTES

A. The FederalForfeiture Statutes
The federal Controlled Substances Act [hereinafter the Federal Act]
allows a federal law enforcement officer to seize cash from a motorist if
there is "probable cause" to believe the motorist intends to use the cash
to purchase illegal drugs or the cash is the proceeds from selling illegal
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The statute reads, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.
Id.
19. See infra text accompanying
See infra text accompanying
422 U.S. 873 (1975).
490 U.S. 1 (1989).
461 U.S. 555 (1983).
416 U.S. 663 (1974).
See infra text accompanying
26. See infra text accompanying
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

notes 27-94.
notes 95-143.

notes 144-249.
notes 250-97.
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After seizure, forfeiture proceedings are required to be
drugs.'
After paying the expenses of the forfeiture
"instituted promptly."'
proceeding, the forfeited cash goes into the United States Treasury.' To

contest the seizure, the claimant must file a claim and post a bond of

"$5,000 or 10 percent of the value of the claimed property, whichever is
lower, but not less than $250."'" If the government prevails and the

property is subject to forfeiture, the claimant must pay for costs and
expenses of the action.3 '

Once the government shows that probable

27. See Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513 § 511(a)(6), (b)(4),
84 Stat. 1242, 1276-77 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), (b)(4) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)). The statute states, in pertinent part:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(6) All moneys... furnished or intended to be furnished by any person
in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this subehapter, all
proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys . . .used or
intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter ....
(b) Any property subject to civil forfeiture to the United States under this
subehapter may be seized by the Attorney General... without ... process
... when(4) the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the property
is subject to civil forfeiture under this subchapter.
Id.
28. Id. § 511(b), 84 Stat. at 1277 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)
(1988)) (when the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the property is
subject to civil forfeiture, "proceedings under subsection (d) of this section shall be
instituted promptly").
29. Id. § 511(e), (1), 84 Stat. at 1277-78 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
881(e), (h) (1988)). The pertinent part of the statute states:
(e)(2)(A) [A]ny moneys forfeited under this subehapter shall be used to pay(i) all property expenses of the proceedings for forfeiture and sale
including expenses of seizure,... advertising, and court costs...
(B) The Attorney General shall forward to the Treasurer of the United
States for deposit . . .any amounts of such moneys and proceeds
remaining after payment of the expenses provided in subparagraph (A).
(h) All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this
section shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to
forfeiture under this section.
Id.
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988).
31. Id.
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cause for forfeiture exists, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the seized item is not subject to forfeiture.32 If the
claimant is successful in the forfeiture proceeding, the court may award

the claimant attorney's fees against the federal government. 3 The award
of attorney's fees and costs to the claimant is mandatory "unless the court

finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified. "I
Although the Supreme Court generally has upheld the constitutionality
of the Federal Act, 35 the Court has established certain limitations on asset

forfeiture. The first limit is the allowance of the innocent owner defense.
In United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue,' a plurality of the Court held
that "an owner's lack of knowledge of the fact that her home had been
purchased with the proceeds of illegal drug transactions constitutes a
defense to a forfeiture proceeding" under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).3 7 The
innocent owner defense38 provides that, unless the government can prove

that an owner had knowledge of the tainted purchase money, the
government can not subject the property to forfeiture.39

32. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988) ("IThe burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant
[to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the seized item is not subject to
forfeiture] ....
Provided, [tihat probable cause shall be first shown for the institution
of such suit or action, to be judged of by the court. .... ").
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993). The statute provides, in pertinent
part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs.
. may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or
against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States
acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such
action.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988). The statute states:
Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and
expenses of attorneys.. . to the prevailing party in any civil action brought
by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United
States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of
such action....
Id.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 95-143 (discussing Supreme Court cases
interpreting the Federal Act as it applies to the seizure of personal property).
36. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
37. Id. at 1129. For the text of the statute, see supra note 27.
38. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1131, 1134.
39. Id.
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The second limitation derives from the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against excessive fines. In Austin v. United States,' Austin
agreed to sell two grams of cocaine. 4 ' The next day, officers searched
his body shop and mobile home pursuant to a search warrant.42 The
officers found "small amounts of marijuana and cocaine, a .22-caliber
revolver, drug paraphernalia, and approximately $4,700 in cash."' Two
months later, the United States filed an in rem action "seeking forfeiture
of Austin's mobile home and auto body shop under 21 U.S.C. §§
881(a)(4) and (a)(7)." The Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment applied to the forfeiture and "remand[ed] the
case for consideration of the question whether the forfeiture at issue here
was excessive."' This holding indicates that courts must examine the
amount of property seized by the government in relation to the alleged
crime. Thus, there is a limit on how much property can be seized by
forfeiture. When the forfeiture is excessive, it violates the defendant's
Eighth Amendment rights.
The third limitation involves the defendant's Fifth Amendment right
to procedural due process. The principle of due process requires that
individuals are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
government can deprive them of real property.'
In United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property,47 officers searched Good's home on
January 31, 1985, pursuant to a search warrant." They found "89
pounds of marijuana, marijuana seeds, vials containing hashish oil, and
drug paraphernalia." 4 9 Good pleaded guilty and was sentenced. ° On
August 8, 1989, the United States filed a forfeiture action against the fouracre parcel of real property on which Good's house was located. 1 The
40. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
41. Id. at 2803.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2810.
46. See generally JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D.
LAW § 13.1, at 487-88 (4th ed. 1991).
47. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
48. Id. at 497.
49. Id.
50. ld.
51. Id.

ROTUNDA, CONSTTUTIONAL
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government seized the property thirteen days later without notifying Good
or providing him with an adversary hearing.'
The primary issue in Good was "whether, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits
the Government in a civil forfeiture case from seizing real property
without first affording the owner notice and an opportunity to be
heard." 53 In considering the issue, the Court distinguished the seizure
of real property from other types of property subject to seizure. When
property is transportable, seizure without prior notice or hearing is
necessary to "establish the court's jurisdiction over the property" and to
guard against the property leaving the jurisdiction. " However, unlike
personalty, real property does not present a risk of flight. Thus, the Court
held that "[u]nless exigent circumstances are present, the Due Process
Clause requires the Government to afford notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard before seizing real property subject to civil

forfeiture. "5
The secondary issue in Good involved the timeliness of the forfeiture
suit.' The statute of limitations for a forfeiture action is five years.57
The statutes governing the forfeiture proceeding do not provide any
penalty for the government's failure to file the forfeiture proceeding on
Good's property in a timely manner after its seizure of the illegal drugs
or his arrest. Even though the government did not file the forfeiture
proceeding until approximately four-and-one-half years after it seized the
illegal drugs, the Court held that the forfeiture proceeding could not be
it had been filed within the five-year statute of
dismissed because
limitations." s
B. The FloridaForfeiture Statutes
The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act [hereinafter the Florida Act]
is similar in many respects to the Federal Act. The Florida Act, like its
federal counterpart, allows a law enforcement officer to seize cash from
a motorist if there is "probable cause" to believe the motorist intends to
use the cash to purchase illegal drugs or the cash is the proceeds from
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 498.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 502-03.
Id. at 505.
56. Id. at 497.
57. 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (Supp. V 1993).
58. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 506-07.
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selling illegal drugs.A9 After seizure, forfeiture proceedings must be
instituted "promptly. " ' ° According to the Florida Act, the agency that
seized the cash must file a forfeiture complaint within forty-five days after
the seizure." The claimant must file a response "within 20 days after
receipt of the complaint and probable cause finding." 62
Despite the similarites, a variety of Florida's provisions are markedly
different from those of the Federal Act. For example, the Florida Act
does not require the claimant to post a bond. Also, in contrast to the
Federal Act, the Florida Act places the burden of proof on the state
agency rather than on the claimant.'
Furthermore, the Florida Act
departs from a preponderance of the evidence standard and incorporates
the more onerous clear and convincing evidence standard.'
These
changes alter the entire scope of the forfeiture proceeding.
Under the Florida Act, the chances of a court awarding attorney's fees
and costs to a claimant are very slim. Even if the claimant wins in the
forfeiture proceeding, the claimant can be awarded attorney's fees and
costs only if "the seizing agency has not proceeded in good faith or...
the seizing agency's action which precipitated the forfeiture proceedings
... was a gross abuse of the agency's discretion."'
Should the cash be
forfeited, the proceeds, except for the amount necessary to pay for the
expenses of the forfeiture proceeding, go into "a special law enforcement
trust fund."' The fund "shall be used for school resource officer, crime
prevention, safe neighborhood, drug abuse education and prevention
programs, or for other law enforcement purposes, which include defraying
the cost of protracted or complex investigations, providing additional
equipment
or expertise and providing matching funds to obtain federal
67
grants."
59. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 932.701-932.703 (West Supp. 1995); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6), (b)(4) (1988); supra note 27.
60. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.704(4) (West Supp. 1995); 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988).
61. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.703(3) (West Supp. 1995); FED. R. CiV. P. C(6)
(Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims) ("[t]he claimant of
property that is the subject of an action in rem shall file a claim within 10 days after
process has been executed .... ").
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.704(5)(c) (West Supp. 1995).
63.
64.
65.
66.

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.704(8) (West Supp. 1995).
id.
FIA. STAT. ANN. § 932.704(10) (West Supp. 1995).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.7055(4)(a) (West Supp. 1995).

67. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.7055(4)(c)(3) (requiring that "any local
law enforcement agency that acquires at least $15,000 pursuant to the Florida Contraband
Forfeiture Act within a fiscal year must expend or donate no less than 15 percent of such
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In Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property,I the Florida
Supreme Court upheld the 1989 version of the Florida Act as long as
certain procedures were followed.'
For personal property, the court
required that there be notice and "the opportunity for an adversarial
preliminary hearing . . . as soon as possible after seizure." 7° At the
preliminary hearing, the state agency would be required "to establish
probable cause to believe that the property was used in the commission of

a crime pursuant to the terms of the [Florida] Act."71 The claimant
would have the right to a jury trial.' To obtain forfeiture of the cash,
the state agency must bear the burden of proof "by no less than clear and
convincing evidence. "I
The Florida Act presently includes the
"procedures" required by the Florida Supreme Court in Department of
Law Enforcement v. Real Property.
C. ProposedAmendments to the Federal and
FloridaFofeiture Statutes
Bills have been introduced in both houses of Congress74 and in both
houses of the Florida legislature 5 to amend the federal and Florida
proceeds for the support or operation of any drug treatment, drug abuse education, drug
prevention, crime prevention, safe neighborhood, or school resource officer
program(s)").
68. 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991).
69. See id. at 968.
70. Id. at 965.
71. Id. at 966.
72. Id. at 967.
73. Id.
74. See H.R. 2417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Act, introduced by U.S. Representative Henry J. Hyde, an Illinois Republican, on June
15, 1993); S. 1655, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (a similarly worded bill introduced by
Senator James M. Jeffords, a Vermont Republican, on November 10, 1993).
75. See H.B. 1755, 1994 Leg., 1st Sess. ("[an act relating to contraband
forfeiture," introduced by Florida State RepresentativeBill Sublette on February 8, 1994,
the first day of the 1994 regular, 60-day legislative session of the Florida Legislature);
see also S.B. 2148, 1994 Leg., 1st Sess. (a similarly worded bill introduced by Florida
State Senator Dennis Jones on February 21, 1994). Both bills died in the 1994 Florida
legislative session.
On March 7, 1995, the first day of the 1995 legislative session, Representative
Sublette introduced a similar bill to amend the Florida Act. H.B. 807, 1995 Leg., 1st
Sess. However, unlike the 1994 version, the 1995 bill allows officers to seize property
and money from motorists without making an arrest. Luz Villareal, Legislators Target
Cash-Seizure Law, ORLANDo SENTINEL, Jan. 19, 1995, at C-3.
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forfeiture statutes. However, none provide a motorist any preseizure
protection. All the reform bills require the government to prove that the
property is subject to forfeiture by clear and convincing evidence76 and

require that the claimant be given assistance with legal fees. The federal
bills require the appointment of an attorne

for the claimants who are

otherwise unable to pay for an attorney.

The Florida bills would

require the judge to award the prevailing claimant "reasonable attorney's
fees and costs."'
The federal bills lengthen the time period within
which the claimant must file a claim from ten to sixty days following the

first publication of the seizure notice.'

Another significant change in the

federal bills from the present statute is the removal of the requirement that

the claimant file a bond before contesting the forfeiture in court.'
The Florida bills contain some additional protection not found in the

federal bills.

Certain language ostensibly takes care of the Austin

excessive fines problem."1 The Senate bill provides: "The value of the

property forfeited under this section may not exceed the pecuniary gain

76. The federal bills would place the burden of proof on the United States
Government to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the property is subject
to forfeiture. See H.R. 2417 § 4; S. 1655 § 5. The present wording of the statute places
the burden on the claimant. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988). Becauseno higher level of proof
is stated in the present statute, the claimant must now prove the property is not subject
to forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence.
Under present law, "clear and convincing evidence . . . [of a] violation of the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act" is required for forfeiture. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
932.704(8) (West Supp. 1995). Both proposed Florida bills would prohibit forfeiture
unless "[tihe seizing agency establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the owner
or other claimant knew, or should have known after a reasonable inquiry, that such
property was being employed or was likely to be employed in criminal activity." H.B.
1755 § 1; S.B. 2148 § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. 932.703(6)(a)). The'proposed
language would make it very clear that the burden of proof is on the seizing agency. Id.
77. H.R. 2417 § 5; S.B. 1655 § 4 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1608).
78. H.B. 1755 § 2; S.B. 2148 § 2 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.704(10)).
For the text of the statute, see supranote 2.
79. H.R. 2417 § 3; S. 1655 § 3 (amending FED. R. Civ. P. C(6) (Supplemental
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims)).
80. H.R. 2417 § 6 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1614). Another proposed amendment,
found only in the House version of the bill, would amend 19 U.S.C. § 1614 to allow the
subject property to be released to the claimant if otherwise the claimant would suffer
"substantial hardship." Id.
81. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (holding that there is a
constitutional problem under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment when
the value of the seized property is greatly disproportionate to the severity of the
underlying offense); supratext accompanying notes 40-45.
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derived from the offense or the pecuniary loss caused by the offense."'
Other language prohibits the use of drug courier profiles in which race is
one of the factors: "Probable cause may not be supported in whole or in
part by reliance on or use of a profile or list which includes race or
ethnicity as any part of its criteria."' The bills would require, prior to
forfeiture, probable cause to make a legal arrest, and that the arrest must
be made, "as a result of the criminal activity in which the property was
being employed or was likely to be employed."" The claimant may
have possession of the seized property during the pendency of the
forfeiture proceedings if the claimant posts a bond.'
Two more problems addressed by the Florida bills are settlements
made without court supervision and use of the forfeited cash for law
To take care of the problem with
enforcement and investigation.
settlements, the Florida Act would be amended as follows:
When the claimant and the seizing law enforcement agency
agree to settle the forfeiture action prior to the conclusion of the
forfeiture proceeding, the settlement agreement shall be reviewed
by the court. No settlements may be made at the site of a vehicle
stop and search[, unless such review is waived by the claimant in
writing, by the court or a mediator or arbitrator agreed upon by
the claimant and the seizing law enforcement agency].'
To resolve the "possible temptation" of allowing the forfeited cash to be
used to supplement regular law enforcement activities, the Florida Act
would be amended as follows:
If the seizing agency is a county or municipal agency, the
remaining proceeds shall be deposited in a special law
enforcement trust fund established by the board of county
commissioners or the governing body of the municipality. Such
proceeds and interest earned therefrom shall be used for school
resource officer, crime prevention, safe neighborhood, drug abuse
education and prevention program[s, or for other law enforcement
purposes, which include defraying the cost of protracted or
82. S.B. 2148 § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 932.703(l)(a)).

83. H.B. 1755 § 1; S.B. 2148 § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.703(2)(0)).
84. H.B. 1755 § 1; S.B. 2148 § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.703(6)(a)).
85. H.B. 1755 § 1; S.B. 2148 § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.703(8) to
allow release of the property "unless the court determines that the nature of the property
would allow it to be used as an instrumentality in the commission of another crime").
86. H.B. 1755 § 2; S.B. 2148 § 2 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.704(7)).
Note that deletions to the act are bracketed and additions are italicized.
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complex litigations, providing additional equipment or expertise
and providing matching funds to obtain federal grants].n
Of the proposed amendments to the federal and Florida forfeiture
statutes, the most significant change concerns attorney's fees. Few of the
Volusia County motorists who had cash seized went to court because they
wanted to save costs by settling and getting a portion of the cash back. 8
If the Florida Act is amended as proposed to reimburse a prevailing
claimant attorney's fees, a higher percentage of the seizures very likely
would be challenged in court. Similarly, the proposed amendments to the
federal statutes would probably lead to an increase in court challenges by
motorists not otherwise able to afford an attorney.
Other significant proposed amendments to the federal statutes include
eliminating the requirements that the claimant post a bond and then bear
the burden of proof in the forfeiture proceeding.' Eliminating the bond
requirement would allow motorists whose cash had just been seized to
more easily afford to contest the matter in court. Shifting the burden of
proof from the claimant to the government and raising the level of proof
from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence
also will favor the claimant.
The other proposed amendments to the Florida Act address additional
problems with the tactics used by the Volusia County Sheriff's Office:
insufficient proof for a forfeiture, 9' race as an unstated factor in the drug
courier profile,91 settlements reached without court supervision,' and
use of forfeited cash for routine law enforcement activities. 3
All the proposed changes to the federal and Florida forfeiture statutes
would help the minority motorist whose cash is seized. However, the
"possible temptation" of seizing ready cash and the hope that the action
will go unchecked remains very real. The innocent minority motorist who
happens to be carrying a large amount of cash is forced to jump through
87. S.B. 2148 § 3 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.7055(4)(a)). Note that
deletions to the act are bracketed.
88. See infra notes 170-72, 231 and accompanying text.
89. See H.R. 2417 § 6 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1614 concerning release of seized
property); see also id. § 4; S. 1655 § 5 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1615 concerning the
burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings).
90. See H.B. 1755 § 1; S.B. 2148 § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. §
932.703(6)(a)).
91. See H.B. 1755 § 1; S.B. 2148 § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. §
932.703(2)(c)).
92. See H.B. 1755 § 2; S.B. 2148 § 2 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.704(7)).
93. See S.B. 2148 § 3 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.7055(4)(c)).
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a number of procedural hoops to get the money back. The motorist will
still lose possession of the cash, possibly for a lengthy time period.
A statutory change not proposed is requiring a judicial hearing shortly
after the seizure. This would be similar to the requirement of a hearing
after an arrest.' 4 An officer may hesitate to seize an innocent motorist's
cash if the officer's actions will be subject to judicial scrutiny within
twenty-four or forty-eight hours. A postseizure hearing would allow the

innocent motorist a realistic chance of having the cash returned within a
more reasonable period of time.

If the hearing were postseizure, the

government would have in rem jurisdiction over the cash and would be
assured that the cash would not "disappear."
III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
APPLICABLE TO CASH SEIZURES

The United States Supreme Court has recognized the "possible
temptation" for abuse of the federal forfeiture statutes because of the
government's "direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
proceeding."'95 As discussed above, the Court recently has provided some
protection to the "innocent owner,"' has required preseizure notice and
94. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991); Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
95. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S.Ct. 492,502 (1993).
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the extent of the government's financial stake
in drug forfeiture is apparent from a 1990 memo, in which the Attorney General urged
United States Attorneys to increase the volume of forfeiture in order to meet the
Department of Justice's annual budget target:
"'We must significantly increase
production to reach our budget target.... Failure to achieve the $470 million projection
would expose the Department's forfeiture program to criticism and undermine confidence
in our budget projections. Every effort must be made to increase forfeiture income
during the remaining three months of [fiscal year] 1990.'" 114 S. Ct. at 502 n.2
(quoting 38 U.S. ATT'YS' BULL. 180 (1990)). Justice Thomas wrote:
And like the majority, I am disturbed by the breadth of new civil
forfeiture statutes such as 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), which subjects to forfeiture
all real property that is used, or intended to be used, in the commission, or
even thefacilitation, of a federal drug offense .... A strong argument can be
made.., that § 881(a)(7) is so broad that it differs not only in degree, but in
kind, from its historical antecedents. . . . Given that current practice under §
881(a)(7) appears to be far removed from the legal fiction upon which the civil
forfeiture doctrine is based, it may be necessary-in an appropriate case-to
reevaluate our generally deferential approach to legislative judgments in this
area of civil forfeiture.
Id. at 515 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
96. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993); supranotes
35-58 and accompanying text.
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hearing for real property,' and has held that forfeiture of property may
be unconstitutional when the forfeiture amounts to an "excessive fine."'
These recent limitations on federal forfeiture all involved real property.
The "possible temptation" for abuse may be more immediate where
an officer stops a motorist and seizes cash. When real property and cars
are seized, the government likely has to bear upkeep or storage costs, and
other incidental costs from the date of seizure until a court decides
whether the property should be forfeited. If the property is forfeited, the
government bears the expenses associated with its sale or continued
maintenance. In contrast, the costs involved with cash seizures are
minimal. In addition, there is always the "possible temptation" for a
dishonest officer to "pocket" some of the cash in exchange for letting the
motorist go or turn in less than the amount seized and "pocket" the
difference.
The Court's recent limitations on federal forfeiture have not extended
to personal property. There are two reasons for this reluctance. One
reason is that each piece of real property is unique and the individual's
"right to maintain control over [the] home, and to be free from
governmental interference, is a private interest of historic and continuing
importance."'
The other reason is that the Court has been loath to
interfere with the legislative branch by declaring a statute unconstitutional,
even in part. Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part
in Good, criticized the majority for holding that seizure of real property
without prior notice or hearing does not comply with due process: "'If the
laws here in question involved any wrong or unnecessary harshness, it was
for Congress, or the people who make congresses, to see that the evil was
corrected. The remedy does not lie with the judicial branch of the
government.'" 1" Thus, it appears that the plight of the motorist will
have to be addressed by the legislative, rather than the judicial, branch.
In addition to personal property interests, the minority motorist is
particularly vulnerable to violations of liberty interests. Essentially, an
overzealous enforcement officer has an incentive under forfeiture statutes
to increase, perhaps unconstitutionally, the number of investigatory stops
of minority motorists. The Supreme Court cases confronting investigatory
stops and preseizure hearings of seized personalty indicate that the
protection for motorists is minimal. The balance of this section will
review four United States Supreme Court cases concerning both
investigatory stops and the seizure of personal property.
97. See Good, 114 S. Ct. at 505.
98. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993).
99. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 501.
100. Id. at 511 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 594 (1881)).
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In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,1°1 two border patrol officers
were in a patrol car parked on the side of Interstate 5 south of San
Clemente, California."02 Because it was evening, the officers were
shining their patrol car headlights on the interstate to observe northbound
passing cars.1" They followed and stopped Brignoni-Ponce's car based
only on the fact that "its three occupants appeared to be of Mexican
descent."" °'
The officers arrested Brignoni-Ponce and the two other
occupants because the two were illegal aliens." ° Brignoni-Ponce filed
a motion to suppress information the officers obtained after they stopped
the car." In deciding whether the stop was constitutionally permitted,
the Court held "that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably
to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in
the ountry, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances
that provoke suspicion."" Applying this reasoning the Court held that
the stop of Brignoni-Ponce's car was unconstitutional because stopping the
car based on the race of the occupants alone did not furnish "reasonable
grounds to believe that the three occupants were aliens. " "
The second case, United States v. Sokolow, 1° involved an airport
rather than a highway stop. Andrew Sokolow and his companion flew
from Honolulu to Miami and returned to Honolulu three days later."1
Police officers and Drug Enforcement Administration agents observed
Sokolow during the round trip."' Upon Sokolow's return to Honolulu,
DEA agents stopped him." 2 Following two sniffs by a "narcotics
detector dog," the dog "alerted" on two pieces of Sokolow's luggage, and
101. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
102. Id.at 874.
103. Id.at 874-75.
104. Id.at 875.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.at 881.
108. Id.at 885-86. Factors the officers could use to support the reasonable
suspicion needed for an investigatory stop include "the characteristics of the area"
("proximity to the border, the usual patterns of traffic on the particular road, and
previous experience with alien traffic"), "erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade
officers," and "persons trying to hide." Id.at 884-85.

109. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
110. Id.at 4.
111. Id.at 4-5.
112. Id.at 5.
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the agents obtained a search warrant and searched the bags."' The
agents discovered 1063 grams of cocaine in one of the two pieces."1
The stop was made based on the following factors: (1) Sokolow had.paid
$2100 for two airplane tickets from a roll of $20 bills that appeared to
contain a total of $4000; (2) he traveled under an assumed name; (3) his
original destination was Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; (4) although
the round trip flight totalled twenty hours, "he stayed in Miami only 48
hours;" (5) he appeared nervous; (6) he checked no luggage; (7) "he was
about 25 years old;"1 5 and (8) "he was dressed in a black jumpsuit and
wore gold jewelry."'
The issue before the Court was "whether the agents had a reasonable
suspicion that [Sokolow] . . . was engaged in wrongdoing when they
encountered him on the sidewalk." 6 In reaching its decision, the Court
considered "the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture"1 1 7 and
stated: "Any one of these factors [in the drug courier profile] is not by
itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent
travel.
But we think taken together they amount to reasonable
suspicion.""s The Court found that the stop was constitutional because
the DEA agents did
have the "reasonable" suspicion needed for an
119
investigatory stop.

In typical fashion, Justice Marshall disagreed with the Sokolow
majority and criticized the magical transformation of the drug profile to
mirror what the officer finds when making the stop. This ever-changing
profile allows an officer to stop a suspect "on the basis of imprecise
stereotypes of what criminals look like, or on the basis of irrelevant
personal characteristics such as race."" 2
Reflexive reliance on a profile of drug courier characteristics runs
a far greater risk than does ordinary, case-by-case police work of
subjecting innocent individuals to unwarranted police harassment
and detention. This risk is enhanced by the profile's "chameleonlike way of adapting to any particular set of observations."' 2
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 3-4.
at 7.
at 8 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
at 9.
at 11.
at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

121. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 831
F.2d 1413, 1419 (9th Cir. 1987)).

NEW YORK L4W SCHOOL LAWREEW

[Vol. 39

In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., the Court held
that due process did not require preseizure notice."25 Puerto Rico police
officers found marijuana on a rented yacht in May 1972.12 They seized
the yacht on July 11, 1972."5 The yacht owner did not learn of the
seizure until forfeiture had already been declared."
The issue in the
case was
whether the Constitution is violated by application to appellee, the
lessor of a yacht, of Puerto Rican statutes providing for seizure
and forfeiture of vessels used for unlawful purposes when (1) the
yacht was seized without prior notice or hearing after allegedly
being used by a lessee for an unlawful purpose, and (2) the
appellee was neither involved in nor aware of the act of the lessee
which resulted in the forfeiture." r
The Court held that this seizure under a forfeiture statute was "an
'extraordinary' situation" in which due process does not require notice or
hearing prior to seizure." The first reason for the holding was to allow
the government the necessary in rem jurisdiction over the yacht, and at the
same time, ensure that the yacht would not continue to be used for further
drug trafficking.'n The second reason was to guard against the yacht
disappearing."
This might occur if the persons renting the yacht
discovered that the government was preparing to institute forfeiture
proceedings. The third reason was that the seizure was "not initiated by
self-interested private parties" but rather by the government after it had
determined that seizure was "appropriate" under applicable statutes."'
United States v. $8850 involved a federal law that requires anyone
carrying more than $5000 in cash when entering the United States to
report the amount to customs."' If the amount is not reported, the
122. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
123. Id. at 679-80.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 665.
Id.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 664.

128. Id. at 679-80.
129. Id. at 679.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. United States v. $8850, 461 U.S. 555, 557 (1983). The statute at issue was
31 U.S.C. § 1101 (1970). Id.
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money may be seized.133 In this case, Mary Vasquez declared that she
did not have more than $5000 in cash when she passed through customs
at Los Angeles International Airport upon her arrival from Canada on
September 10, 1975.134 A customs officer found that Ms. Vasquez was
carrying $8850, and so the officer seized the cash.13 In March 1977,
the United States Attorney filed proceedings to have the cash
forfeited."
During the eighteen months between the cash seizure and
the filing of forfeiture proceedings, Ms. Vasquez filed a petition for
mitigation and the United States investigated and obtained criminal
indictments against Ms. Vasquez." 7
The $8850 Court reaffirmed its holding from Calero-Toledo that
preseizure notice or hearing is not required when personal property is
seized pursuant to a forfeiture statute:
The general rule, of course, is that absent an "extraordinary
situation" a party cannot invoke the power of the state to seize a
person's property without a prior judicial determination that the
seizure is justified .... [Calero-Toledo] clearly indicates that due
process does not require federal customs officials to conduct a
hearing before seizing items subject to forfeiture. . . . [The
seizure serves important governmental purposes; a preseizure
notice might frustrate the statutory purpose; and the seizure was
made by138government officials rather than self-motivated private
parties.
However, the real issue in $8850 was: "when [does] a postseizure delay
...
become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been
deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time"?" 9 Although
an eighteen-month delay was "quite significant,"' 40 the Court held that
the reasons for the delay were "substantial" under the circumstances. 1
During the eighteen months, the United States used "diligent efforts" to
handle Ms. Vasquez' petition for mitigation and to bring criminal charges
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

$8850, 461 U.S. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 558-60.
Id. at 562 n.12.
Id. at 562-63.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 568.
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against her.142 The Court reasoned that "Vasquez never indicated that
she desired early commencement of a civil forfeiture proceeding, and she
has not asserted or shown that the delay prejudiced her ability to defend
against the forfeiture. Therefore the claimant was not denied due process
of law." 1"
As shown in Brignoni-Ponce, Sokolow, Calero-Toledo, and $8850, the
motorist and those similarly situated have been afforded little protection
by the Supreme Court. Although a motorist may not be stopped because
of race alone, the stop may be made on the reasonable suspicion that the
motorist has committed, is committing, or will commit a crime. A
motorist may even be stopped on the basis of a drug courier profile as
long as the profile supports a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.
Once the motorist is stopped, cash may be seized because of a claimed
connection with illegal drugs. The motorist has no right to preseizure
notice or hearing. If there is an ongoing investigation of a motorist or
other legitimate reasons for a delay, the government may wait more than
a year after the seizure to file the forfeiure proceeding.
IV. How SHERIFF VOGEL FARED IN COURT AND IN THE NEWSPAPERS
A. History of the Vogel Highway Stops
In 1985, a Florida Highway Patrol Trooper named Robert L. Vogel
was assigned to 1-95 to stop drug traffickers.'" On that assignment, he
made a number of highway stops on 1-95, seven of which became the
subject of appellate cases. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit decided United States v. Miller" and United States v.
Smith,1" the Supreme Court of Florida decided Cresswell v. State147
and State v. Johnson,1" and the District Court of Appeal of Florida
142.
143.
144.
Dec. 20,
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 569.
Id. at 569-70.
Jeff Brazil, Bob Vogel-Lightning Rod in U.S. Debate, ORLANDo SENTINEL,
1992, at A-1 [hereinafter Brazil, Lightning Rod].
821
799
564
561

F.2d 546 (lth Cir. 1987).
F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986).
So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1990).
So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1990).
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decided Velez v. State, 9 In re Forfeiture of $6003,11 and Esteen v.
State.151
Vogel left the Florida Highway Patrol in 1988 to run for Volusia
County Sheriff."' Soon after taking office, Sheriff Vogel placed a fiveperson Selective Enforcement Team on 1-95. Using some of the same

tactics Vogel had used as a highway patrol trooper, the Selective
Enforcement Team
stopped motorists, searched cars, and seized illegal
153
drugs and cash.
Officers on the Selective Enforcement Team stop cars traveling on I-

95 for alleged traffic violations. 1"

If an officer is suspicious that a

stopped car contains illegal drugs or "drug money," the officer detains the

motorist and searches the car. Most searches proceed after the officer
obtains the driver's consent. If the driver refuses consent for the search,

the officer calls in a drug dog. 55 The drug dog is trained to "alert" the
officer to the presence of drugs by barking or wagging its tail if it smells
149. 554 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 563 So. 2d 635
(Fla. 1990).
150. 505 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 511 So. 2d 998 (Fla,),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987).
151. 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
152. See Brazil, Lightning Rod, supra note 144, at A-10.
153. See id. (discussing the history of Sheriff Vogel and the Selective Enforcement
Team).
154. See Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Seizing Cash is No Sweat for Deputies,
ORLANDo SENTINEL, June 14, 1992, at A-17 [hereinafter Brazil & Berry, Seizing Cash
is No Sweat] (descnbing the "alleged traffic violations" as minor infractions such as
"failure to maintain a single lane, following too closely, defaced license tag or broken
taillight").
155. See id. According to the newspaper, the same "script" was generally followed
after a stop was made:
What happened after cars were ordered to the roadside is the key. Once the
deputy issued a warning-or in rare eases-a citation, he would turn and begin
walking away, according to dozens of drivers interviewed.
The deputy would then pause, return to the car and ask permission to
search.
In most cases, drivers consented.
Records show that at least a handful of drivers initially refused to allow
a search. They were told they would be detained until a drug-sniffing dog
could be summoned. The drivers allowed the searches.
If they hadn't, the dog would have been led around the outside of the car.
If he barked or wagged his tail, deputies would have had "probable
cause" to believe that drugs or drug money were inside, and they could search
without the driver's consent.
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a controlled substance. The dog can detect even trace amounts of cocaine
clinging to paper currency."
If the dog "alerts," the officer has
"probable cause" to believe the car contains illegal drugs or "drug
money" and the officer will proceed with the search.
As a result of the Selective Enforcement Team's stops in the three
years preceding June 1992, the Volusia County Sheriff's Office seized
almost $8 million in cash.157 No criminal charges were filed in 199 of
156. See Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, You May Be Drug-Free,But Is Your Money?,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 15, 1992, at A-6. The problem with using a drug dog to
detect cocaine-tainted money is that a very high percentage of the paper currency in
circulation is "tainted" with minute traces of cocaine. The dog's sense of smell is so
keen that it can detect these minute amounts clinging to the currency. A number of
leading citizens in the Orlando area agreed to participate in a test done by The Orlando
Sentinel. Currency from their wallets was tested as was currency from a local
supermarket. "The results: Six of nine samples carried detectable amounts of cocaine."
Id. The article explains this contamination:
The reason: cocaine adheres to what it touches.
The contamination spreads through a variety of means. Cocaine users roll
up bills like straws to inhale the drug into their nostrils. Dealers hide money
and drugs together. They "launder" cash profits by injecting the money into
circulation. Seized money is deposited into banks, intermingled with other
bills.
Id.; see also Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin., 819 F. Supp. 698 (M.D.
Tenn. 1993):
As the Drug Enforcement Administration's own chemists reported...
currency in general circulation in this country is contaminated with traces of
narcotics. . . . [The] Chief Toxicologist for Florida Dade County Medical
Examiner's Office... found that 97% of the bills from around the country
tested positively for cocaine, and... clean bills are contaminated in banks
when they come in contact with contaminated ones....
It cannot be doubted that a narcotics detection dog's sense of smell is
quite keen. Other courts have observed that a dog can detect narcotics even
in the microscopic quantities in which it is present in contaminated currency.
:.. [B]ills may contain as little as a millionth of a gram of cocaine, but that
is many times more cocaine than is needed for a dog to alert....
The presence of trace narcotics on currency does not yield any relevant
information whatsoever about the currency's history. A bill may be
contaminated by proximity to a large quantity of cocaine, by its passage
through the contaminated sorting machines at the Federal Reserve Banks, or
by contact with other contaminated bills in the wallet or at the bank.
Id. at 720 (discussing other federal cases).
157. See John C. Van Gieson & Sean Somerville, Governor's Panel to Review
Seizures, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 18, 1992, at A-1, A-14 [hereinafter Van Gieson &
Somerville, Governor's Panel].
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262 cash seizure cases."'

Of those 199 cases, ninety-one percent

involved African-American and Hispanic travelers and sixty-three percent
involved seizures of $20,000 or less. 19 One-fourth of the 199 drivers
made no attempt to get their money back,"6 all monies were returned
to four drivers,"' and the remaining drivers got back fifty to ninety
percent of their money after agreeing not to contest the forfeitures."
The settlements were handled by the attorney for the Volusia County
Sheriff's Office." e Of the nearly $8 million seized, the sheriff's office
kept almost one half. 64
Several factors, aside from the large amount of cash seized and the
low number of arrests, indicate that the emphasis of the Selective
Enforcement Team is confiscating cash rather than pressing criminal
charges against drug traffickers. One factor is the direction or apparent
destination of the vehicles. For example, a much higher percentage of
cars were stopped in the southbound lanes, where the drug trafficker is
likely to be carrying cash, than in the northbound lanes where the drug
trafficker is likely to be carrying drugs."6 Eighty-seven percent of the
158. See Steve Berry & Jeff Brazil, Blacks, HispanicsBig Losers in Cash Seizures,

ORLANDo SENTINEL, June 15, 1992, at A-1, A-6 [hereinafter Berry & Brazil, Big Losers
in Cash Seizures].
159. See id. at A-6 (table). Of the 1-95 stops in which cash was seized, 18%
involved $5000 or less, 18% involved $5001 to $10,000, and 27% involved $10,001 to
$20,000. See id. (table). See also Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Seizure Law Review Will
Begin Today, ORLANDO SENTInEL, Sept. 16, 1992, at A-1, A-7 [hereinafter Brazil &
Berry, Seizure Review]. The article reported:
Paul Steinberg, who wrote the law and was the state Senate's chief
sponsor ... was outraged to read the Sentinel report that 36 percent of the
Volusia cash seizures involved $10,000 or less.
"That's not the drug-dealing profile we were talking about," he said.
The law was designed to get at "mules" or drug couriers carrying
$100,000 in the trunk of their cars, he said.
Id.
160. See Brazil & Berry, Seizing Cash hr No Sweat, supra note 154, at A-17.
161. See Brazil & Berry, Seizure Review, supranote 159, at A-7.
162. See Brazil & Berry, Seizing Cash Is No Sweat, supra note 154, at A-17.
163. See id.
164. See Berry & Brazil, Big Losers in Cash Seizures, supra note 158, at A-6.
165. See Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Colorof Driver is Key to Stops in 1-95 Videos,
ORLANDo SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 1992, at A-1, A-10 [hereinafter Brazil & Berry, Color
of Driver is Key]. A 1991 article about Vogel implies that a major goal of the Selective
Enforcement Team was to seize cash:
[Vogel had] noticed, in all his time maling drug arrests in the northbound
lanes of 1-95, that no matter how large the haul of dope or cocaine, he almost
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cars were stopped when traveling in the southbound lanes of 1-95, as
compared with only thirteen percent traveling in the northbound lanes."
"A tally of roadside seizures shows that arrests for drug possession were
highest in the beginning of the program in 1989 but have decreased
significantly, while cash seizures have increased."16 Another factor is
the lack of arrests arising from subsequent investigations. Although the
team investigated the drivers who contested the seizures, there were no
arrests made as a result of these investigations. 11 A third factor is that
the sheriff's office has reached settlements even with "drug trafficking"
motorists against whom criminal charges were filed.
Under the
settlements, the "drug traffickers" got back a percentage of the cash seized
and the sheriff's office kept the rest. 169
Few of the drivers whose cash was seized by the Selective
Enforcement Team have gone to court to contest the seizure because of the
litigation costs involved. 1 As of June 14, 1992, only one of the 199
cash seizure-no-arrest cases had gone to trial. In that case, the trial judge
awarded the Volusia County Sheriff's Office the entire $22,520 seized
never found any significant amounts of cash. Where were the huge sums of
money the drug trade required?
He raised his eyes and beheld ... the southbound lanes of 1-95. If the
drugs were being piped north [from the Miami area], maybe the money was
flowing south. And in the last two years, his deputies have used a modified
version of his profile to harvest $6.5 million in cash from southbound cars.
Charles Fishman, Sheriff Bob Vogek He's the Mayor of 1-95, and a Terror to Drug
Smugglers, FLORIDA MAa., Aug. 11, 1991, at 6 [hereinafter Fishman, Mayor of 1-951.
166. See Brazil & Berry, Color of Driver is Key, supranote 165, at A-10; see also
Brazil, Lightning Rod, supranote 144, at A-10 (graphic).
167. Brazil & Berry, Tainted Cash, supra note 7, at A-16.
168. Id.
169. See Steve Berry & Jeff Brazil, ...But Sometimes, Bad Guys Get off Easy,
ORLANDo SENTINEL, June 16, 1992, at A-4. A Volusia County Sheriff's officer seized

pearly $190,000 from Douglas Harbert and Thomas Pasco after stopping their car on I95. In addition to the cash, the officer discovered: "7 grams of cocaine, 15 grams of
marijuana, cocaine sifters still powdered with residue, a roach clip and rolling papers."
Id. The officer filed felony cocaine charges against the two men but the men later
entered guilty pleas to misdemeanor drug convictions. The sheriff's office returned
$28,685 to them and transferred another $58,545 to the Internal Revenue Service to pay
back taxes owed by Harbert. Id.
170. See Jeff Brazil & Sean Somerville, Judge Orders Sheriff's Office to Return
$265,000 to Motorist, ORLANDo SENTINE, June 25, 1992, at A-1, A-10 [hereinafter
Brazil & Somerville, Judge Orders Return]. The amount paid in attorney fees for
negotiating an out-of-court settlement ranged from $1000 to one third of the money the
client received from the Volusia County Sheriff's Office in settlement. Presumably the
attorney's fees would have been significantly higher had the cases gone to court.
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because the person contesting the seizure had a long criminal record.'
In late June 1992, a second case went to trial. The Florida circuit court
judge ordered the entire $265,000 returned to an African-American 1-95

motorist.172

B. How Vogel Has Faredin Court
None of the contested seizures occurring since Vogel became Volusia
County Sheriff have reached the appellate level of review, and no factual

records exist from that time period. However, the seven appellate cases
in which Vogel was involved as a Florida Highway Patrol trooper are
worth reviewing because the tactics he used as a trooper to stop 1-95
motorists are very similar to the tactics used by the Volusia County

Selective Enforcement Team.'
In all but two of the cases, Vogel alleged that the match to a drug
courier profile gave him reasonable suspicion for the stop.174 The
171. See Brazil & Berry, Seizing Cash Is No Sweat, supranote 154, at A-17.
172. See generally Brazil & Somerville, Judge Orders Return, supra note 170, at
A-1. The facts of the Duncan seizure are as follows: On April 25, 1991, a Volusia
County Sheriffs officer stopped Aubrey Marcus Duncan and his passengerbecausetheir
car "swerved." They were traveling at the speed limit in a "4-door sedan" with out-ofstate license plates. After asking a few questions, the officer turned to leave, and then
asked permission to search the car. Duncan refused permission. The officer called in
a drug dog, citing Duncan's "nervousness," his refusal to permit the search, and
statements that conflicted with those of his passenger as support for his actions. The dog
alerted the second time around Duncan's car "as if in response to a command." The
officer seized the $265,000 he found in a bag in the trunk of Duncan's car. In the
forfeiture proceeding, the circuit judge ruled that the stop had violated Mr. Duncan's
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. Id.
Duncan's subsequent arrest, in October 1992 by a New Jersey State Police officer
who found four kilograms of cocaine and a pound of heroin in Duncan's car after pulling
him over for speeding, raised questions regarding the validity of the Selective
Enforcement Team's cash seizures. See Jeff Brazil, Cash Seizure Target Faces Drug
Charges, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 29, 1992, at B-1.
On May 12, 1993, Duncan filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Volusia
County Sheriff's Office and Robert Vogel. Duncan v. Volusia County Sheriff's Office,
No. 93-304-CIV-ORL-18 (M.D. Fla. filed May 12, 1993). That casewas subsequently
dismissed and refied, Duncan v. Volusia County, No. 93-478-CIV-ORL-22 (M.D. Fla.
filed June 18, 1993).
173. See Brazil, LightningRod, supranote 144, at A-10 (describing Vogel's seizure
tactics).
174. See Velez v. State, 554 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating
that certain factors were used for the stop but failing to specify them), review denied, 563
So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1990); Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(noting many factors similar to the drug courier profile but not expressly stating the use
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profile included the following ten elements: (1) the day of the week; (2)
the time of day; (3) the type of vehicle; (4) the model year of vehicle; (5)
whether the vehicle had two or four doors; (6) the license tag; (7) the
presence of a CB or radar detector; (8) the number of occupants in the
car; (9) the age group of the occupants; and (10) the destination of the
vehicle.'
In In re Forfeiture of $6003, 176 the elements were: (1) a late model
car with Florida rental tags; (2) two occupants; (3) a male driver
approximately thirty-five years old; (4) a car traveling north on 1-95, "a
route frequently used by drug couriers"; (5) a car driven extremely
cautiously; and (6) a driver not looking at Vogel as the driver passed
by.'
In $6003, there was no claim of a traffic violation: "although
[the driver] had not broken any law, [Vogel] stopped him because in
[Vogel's] experience persons who fit the profile sometimes carried
drugs. "178
In United States v. Smith,"' the elements were: (1) a 1985 Mercury
with out-of-state tags; (2) two occupants approximately thirty years old;
(3) car traveling north on 1-95 at 3:00 a.m.; (4) car driven "overly
cautious" at fifty miles per hour; and (5) a driver not looking at Vogel as
the driver passed by." 8
After observing these factors, Vogel followed Smith and stopped him
because Smith was "weaving." He stated:
I observed the right side of the wheels of that vehicle cross over
the white painted edge line approximately six inches into the
emergency lane.
The vehicle was then brought back into the center of the
white [right?] north-bound lane. Then the car drifted over to the
white painted center line. However, the wheels did not touch or
cross over the center line.
The vehicle then weaved an additional two times before it was

stopped. 181

of the drug courier profile).
175. State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1139, 1140 n.2 (Fla. 1990).
176. 505 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 511 So. 2d 998 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987).
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 669.
Id.
799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 706.

181. Id.
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In Cresswell v. State,1 the elements were: (1) a full-sized car with
a large trunk, Maine tags and registration, and New York state insurance
and inspection stickers; (2) a Massachusetts licensed driver traveling
alone; (3) a car traveling on 1-95 at 1:55 p.m.; (4) a car registered to
someone else; (5) the floor beneath the driver's seat held a steering wheel
lock; (6) items normally stored in the trunk were on the back seat; (7) the
ignition key was separate from the other keys; and (8) a CB radio. 1"
The alleged motor vehicle violation was that the Cresswell car was
following another car too closely."'
In State v. Johnson," the elements were: (1) large model car with
out-of-state tags; (2) driver alone; (3) a male driver approximately thirty
years old wearing casual clothes; (4) a car traveling on 1-95 at 4:15 a.m.;
and (5) a car driven "overly cautious" at speed limit. 1" As in $6003,
the drug courier profile was given as the only reason for the stop."s
In United States v. Miller,18 the elements were: (1) a car with outof-state tags; (2) male driver; (3) car traveling on 1-95 at approximately
9:40 p.m.; (4) a car driven in an "overly cautious" manner; (5) a car
driven just below the posted speed limit; and (6) the driver not turning his
head to look at the patrol car's headlights. "9 Based on these factors,
Trooper Vogel decided to pursue Miller's car in order to stop and
search the car for drugs. After turning into traffic, Trooper
Vogel observed Miller put on his turn signal and pass two slower
moving vehicles. Trooper Vogel stated that Miller was driving
182. 564 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1990).
183. Id. at 481.
184. Id.
185. 561 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1990).
186. Id. at 1140.
187. Id. at 1141. The Johnson majority voiced its objections to the use of a drug
courier profile to stop motorists on 1-95:
Indeed, the class of persons described by Trooper Vogel's profile is enormous.
This profile literally would permit police to stop tens of thousands of lawabiding tourists, businessmen or commuters, just as the "profile" in BrignoniPonce would have authorized unrestrained stops of law-abiding MexicanAmericans. The resulting intrusion upon the privacy rights of the innocent is
too great for a democratic society to bear. Were we to approve this profile,
we might just as well approve a profile based on racial or ethnic
characteristics, religious background, sex or any other completely innocent
trait.
Id. at 1143.
188. 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987).
189. Id. at 547.
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"overly cautious." After Miller had passed the vehicles, he
changed lanes into the right lane and, in so doing, allowed his
right wheels to cross over the white painted lane marker about
four inches, in violation of Florida traffic laws. According to
Trooper Vogel, Miller drove with his wheels across the line for
about one tenth of a mile (or, at 55 miles per hour, approximately
6 1/2 seconds)." g
When Vogel stopped Miller, Vogel told him that he was being stopped for
"failure to drive in a single lane. "19
As the above illustrations indicate, the information in Vogel's profile
is not in any particular way related to drug traffickers any more than it is
related to innocent motorists. The ten elements of Vogel's basic profile
would form answers to the simple questions "who?," "what?," "when?,"
and "why?" It is information an observer of a car would give to describe
the car to someone who had not been there to observe the scene. In
reviewing the five profiles, it is difficult to determine which factors-or
how all the factors of a profile together-could have given Vogel the
"reasonable suspicion" required for investigatory stops. Rather, the
various profiles appear to be descriptions of average motorists on 1-95.
The only factor that appears in all five of the profiles is that the cars
were driven by males on 1-95. Additionally, the factor that appears in all
of the profiles, except the one in Cresswell, is that the cars were being
driven cautiously.192 In addition, in $6003, Smith, and Miller, the driver
did not look at the patrol car or at the patrol car headlights as the suspect
passed by Vogel's patrol car."n In $6003, Smith, and Johnson either
the driver or the occupants were in their thirties. 9
In the Johnson and $6003 cases, Vogel stopped the cars solely on the
basis of the drug courier profile." 9 Accordingly, the courts found that
there was no reasonable suspicion for the stops and held them invalid. 1"
Smith and Miller are similar because Vogel claimed he stopped the drivers
because they conformed with the drug courier profile and because their
190.
191.
192.
So. 2d at
193.
194.
669.
195.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 547; Smith, 799 F.2d at 706; Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1140; $6003, 505
669.
Miller, 821 F.2d at 547; Smith, 799 F.2d at 706; $6003, 505 So. 2d at 669.
Smith, 799 F.2d at 706; Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1140; $6003, 505 So. 2d at
Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1142-43; $6003, 505 So. 2d at 669-70.

196. Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1142-43; $6003, 505 So. 2d at 669-70.
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cars were "weaving. "'n In holding the stops invalid, the Smith and
Miller courts found that the alleged "weaving" was merely a pretext for
the stops.1
The Smith court explained the standard for determining
when a stop for an alleged traffic violation is pretextual: "[l]n determining
whether an investigative stop is invalid as pretextual, the proper inquiry
is whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the absence
of illegitimate motivation." 199 The court concluded that "a reasonable
officer would not have stopped the appellants without an invalid purpose
to obtain evidence of additional criminal activity."2W
In Velez, the defendant was stopped for following too closely."9 In
Esteen, the defendant was driving "in an erratic fashion... consistent
with the behavior of a person driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, or of a person falling asleep at the wheel."' In Cresswell, the
car was stopped for following too closely and because it fit the drug
courier profile.'
The Velez, Cresswell, and Esteen courts held that the
stops were constitutional as legitimate traffic stops.'
Re-examining the seven Vogel cases reviewed in this section, it
appears that an investigatory stop is permissible only if the officer has
observed the driver commit a legitimate, albeit minor, traffic violation.
None of the stops were upheld when the sole basis for the investigatory
stop was the driver's conformity to the drug courier profile.
Although the Supreme Court upheld investigatory stops based on a
drug courier profile in Sokolow,' Florida courts have rejected this
criteria for traffic stops. This departure seems to arise from the factual
distinctions between the Vogel and Sokolow stops. In Sokolow, the United
States Supreme Court allowed DEA agents to make an investigatory stop
197. See Miller, 821 F.2d at 547; Smith, 799 F.2d at 706.
198. Miller, 821 F.2d at 549; Smith, 799 F.2d at 708.
199. Smith, 799 F.2d at 708. Nationally, courts are divided as to what constitutes
a legitimate traffic stop. In the Seventh Circuit, for example, a traffic stop is legitimate
if "the police are doing no more than they are legally permitted and objectively
authorized to do." United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991).
The Supreme Court of Florida has adopted the 11th Circuit's test as enunciated in
Smith. See Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094, 1096-97 (Fla. 1988).
200. Smith, 799 F.2d at 708.
201. Velez v. State, 554 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), review denied,
563 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1990).
202. Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
203. Cresswellv. State, 564 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 1990).
204. Id. at 483; Velez, 554 So. 2d at 547; Esteen, 503 So. 2d at 358.
205. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1988).
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based on a drug courier profile.'
On the day of his stop, agents
observed the defendant in two airports. 1 In contrast, Vogel may have
observed the motorists he stopped for only a few seconds. 3 It is hard
to imagine a set of factors, even viewed together, which would give an
officer reasonable suspicion of illegal activity when the officer observed
a car for such a short time.
C. How Vogel Has Faredin the Newspapers
Prior to June 1992, the articles in the Orlando Sentinel and its Sunday
magazine were favorable to Sheriff Vogel and the tactics of the Volusia
County Selective Enforcement Team. The titles of the articles are
indicative of this positive attitude: Sheriff Bob Vogel: He's the Mayor of
1-95, and a Terror to Drug Smugglers' and 1-95 Deputy Racks up
Numbers in Drug War.21°
In June 1992, things started to change when the Orlando Sentinel
published a Pulitzer Prize-winning series of articles by Jeff Brazil and
Steve Berry."' The series criticized the practices of Sheriff Vogel's
five-man Selective Enforcement Team and described Selena Washington's
ordeal."' Since 1992, the Orlando Sentinel has published a number of
follow-up articles dealing with Sheriff Vogel and his Selective
Enforcement Team. Several of the follow-up articles also have dealt with
Selena Washington. This section of the article will review the newspaper
accounts relating to Sheriff Vogel.
206. Id. at 11.
207. Id. at 5.
208. See Brazil & Berry, Color of Driver is Key, supra note 165, at A-I, A-10.
Many of the highway stops were made at night after the motorist was observed driving
through the are of the patrol car headlights shining across the highway. A "headlights
specialist" has estimated that the suspect motorist may have crossed through the arc of
the patrol car headlights in less than a second. Id. at A-10 (diagram). "Headlights on
their [Volusia County Sheriff's officers'] 1990 Chevrolet Caprices cast a 40-foot-wide
beam at 50 feet. At 72 mph, average interstate speed, cars cross the lighted area in .38
seconds." Id.
209. Fishman, Mayor of 1-95, supranote 165, at 6.
210. Kevlin Haire, 1-95 Deputy Racks up Numbers in Drug War, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Jan. 31, 1992, at B-1 (reporting that Volusia County Sheriff's Sergeant Bobby
Jones set a "record" by seizing $697,599 in cash after stopping a van driver for swerving
across the southbound lanes of 1-95).
211. See Berry & Brazil, Big Losers in Cash Seizures, supra note 158, at A-i;
Brazil & Berry, Lottery Winner's Luck Runs Out, supra note 7, at A-4; Brazil & Berry,
Deputies Take $19,000, supra note 1, at A-16.
212. See Brazil & Berry, Deputies Take $19,000, supra note 1, at A-16.
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The initial series of unfavorable press accounts was published June 1416, 1992. On June 17, Florida Governor Lawton Chiles announced that
he would create a panel to investigate cash seizures by the Selective
Enforcement Team."' The same day, Sheriff Vogel announced two
changes in the way the Team would operate: "[D]iscussions between
squad members and [the head of the Selective Enforcement Team] will be
put in writing and out-of-court settlements will be reviewed by his
staff.""1 " Governor Chiles' panel began its review on September
16.215

Even as the panel deliberated, Sheriff Vogel announced five new
requirements in the cash seizure program:
That the unit issue more tickets and written warnings. That
deputies try to record the traffic infraction on the same dashmounted video camera on which they record the subsequent
search and seizure. That the squad leader, sheriff's attorney and
department's second in command be consulted before money is
seized. That the division commander review the videos weekly.
That all out-of-court settlements be approved by the sheriff and
his senior staff. 6
On February 26, 1993, finding "nothing to warrant further action from
Gov. Lawton Chiles," the governor's panel disbanded. 217 Panelists cited
Sheriff Vogel's reforms and the striking drop in seizures since June 1992
as the reasons for their inaction.21 In fact, the Team's seizures dropped
from 260 in the three years preceding June 1992 to "just a handful"
between June 1992 and February 1993.219 In addition, the Florida
Legislature adjourned its regular sixty-day session in early April 1992
without amending the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.
The unfavorable press and the governor's interest in Sheriff Vogel's
forfeiture practices were followed by civil rights lawsuits against the
controversial sheriff. On May 12, 1993, Aubrey Marcus Duncan filed a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against Sheriff Vogel and the Volusia County
213. See Van Gieson & Somerville, Governor's Panel, supranote 157, at A-14.
214. See id.
215. See Brazil & Berry, Seizure Review, supranote 159, at A-1.
216. See Craig Quintana, Vogel Offers 5 Reforms for Cash Seizures, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Jan. 30, 1993, at B-1, B-4.
217. Jeff Brazil & Craig Quintana, Vogel Panel Disbands: 'He's Cleaned up His
Act', ORLANDO SENTnEL, Feb. 27, 1993, at A-1.
218. Id. at A-11.
219. Id.
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Sheriff's Office, alleging that the Selective Enforcement Team violated
Mr. Duncan's constitutional rights when it seized his $265,000 during a

1991 traffic stop.'

In the lawsuit, Mr. Duncan requested compensatory

and punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs." About a month
later, Selena Washington and the Florida State Conference of NAACP
Branches filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981?2 and 1983

against Robert Vogel and Volusia County, alleging "[r]acially motivated,

purposeful discrimination" and violations of the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment and the
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The
220. See Duncan v. Volusia County Sheriff's Office, No. 93-304-CIV-ORL-18
(M.D. Fla. filed May 12, 1993). That case was subsequently dismissed and refied;
Duncan v. Volusia County, No. 93-478-CIV-ORL-22 (M.D. Fla. filed June 18, 1993).
See generally Jeff Brazil, Driver Sues, Says 1-95 Seizure Biased, ORLANDo SENTINEL,
May 13, 1993, at B-i [hereinafter Brazil, Driver Sues]; see also supranote 18 (text of
42 U.S.C. § 1983).
221. See Complaint at 9, Duncan v. Volusia County, No. 93-478-CIV-ORL-22
(M.D. Fla. filed June 18, 1993). Regarding punitive damages, see generally Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (holding that punitive damages may be awarded against
an individual defendant in a § 1983 action "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be
motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference
to the federally protected rights of others"); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453
U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding that punitive damages may not be awarded against a city
"[a]bsent a compelling reason for approving such an award"). In Newport, the Court
was concerned that allowing a jury to award punitive damages against a municipality or
other governmental entity might be more punitive than necessary. The Court reasoned
that the jury's knowledge of the governmental unit's "unlimited taxing power" might
trigger disproportionately large punitive damages awards. Id. at 270-71.
Perhaps the three-year-long tactics of the Volusia County Sheriff's office in stopping
a high percentage of minority motorists on 1-95 and seizing cash without making arrests
presents a "compelling reason" for an award of punitive damages.
Duncan's suit was dismissed after opposing counsel claimed Duncan had failed to
furnish answers to interrogatories. Lawyer Appeals Decision in Volusia Sheriff's Case,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 14, 1994, at D-3. On May 13, 1994, Duncan appealed the
dismissal. Id.
222. This provison states, in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdictions of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to... the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. V 1993).
223. See Complaint at 1, Washington v. Vogel, No. 93-482-CIV-ORL-18 (M.D.
Fla. filed June 18, 1993) (on later pleadings, the case number is shown as "No. 93-482CIV-ORL-22"). Robert Vogel was named "individually and in his official capacity as
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lawsuit sought injunctive and equitable relief and compensatory and
punitive damages.' Jorge Nater later joined the class action.'
Meanwhile, Sheriff Vogel attracted the attention of the nation's chief
law enforcement offical and influential members of Congress. Attorney
General Janet Reno announced that the FBI had been asked to investigate
the Volusia County Selective Enforcement Team for a "prosecutable
Representative Henry J.
violation of federal civil rights statutes."'
Hyde, an Illinois Republican, introduced "[a] bill to reform certain statutes
An almost identical bill was
regarding civil asset forfeiture." z
introduced in the Senate by Vermont Republican James M. Jeffords.
Chairman John Conyers of the House Committee on Government
Operations, had convened hearings on Capitol Hill to investigate abuse of
forfeiture statutes, ' and he invited Selena Washington to testify.'
Ms. Washington told the committee how the Selective Enforcement Team
seized $19,000 from her and why she later settled for $15,000 rather than
Sheriff of Volusia County, Florida." Id.
224. Id. at 2. A number of significant rulings have been made in the case. On June
15, 1994, the federal judge denied class action status. See Mary Murphy, Judge Refuses
to Curb Drug Unit, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 16, 1994, at B-1. In August, a second
motion for class action status was dismissed for failure to file the motion within 90 days
of the initial complaint. Washington v. Vogel, 158 F.R.D. 689, 692 (M.D. Fla. 1994);
Mary Murphy, Class-Action Status Denied in Lawsuit Against Vogel, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Aug. 13, 1994, at D-3. The case went to trial on January 6, 1995. See Steve
Berry, Drug Squad's 1-95 Tactics Going on Trial, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 6, 1995, at
A-1. However, the court dismissed the suit after five days of testimony presented by the
plaintiffs because they failed to show that the stops of Washington and Nater were
pretextual. Washington v. Vogel, No. 93-482-CIV-ORL-22, slip op. at 4-5 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 26, 1994); Steve Berry, Judge Throws out Suit Against Vogel, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Jan. 14, 1995, at A-i, A-11 [hereinafter Berry, Judge Throws out Suit].
225. See Steve Berry, Puerto Rican Joins Cash-SeizureSuit, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Oct. 15, 1993, at B-3 [hereinafter Berry, PuertoRican Joins Suit]; supranote 7 (stating
the facts of Jorge Nater's case).
226. Berry & Brazil, FBI, supra note 1, at A-1.
227. H.R. 2417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see supra Part II.C. (discussing the
proposed amendments to the Act).
228. S. 1655, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see supra Part II.C. (discussing the
proposed amendments to the Act).
229. See Brazil, Legalized Theft, supra note 1, at B-1.
230. See Review ofFederalAssetForfeitureProgram:HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Legislation and National Security of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 141-54 (1993); Brazil, Congressman,supra note 1, at A-1, A-6.
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pay the
costs and attorney's fees necessary to contest the seizure in
23 1
court.

Back in Volusia County, the lawsuits had a significant effect on the
local political scene. By October 7, Ms. Washington's class action had

cost Volusia County about $32,000 in attorney's fees and costs, but only

231. See Brazil, Congressman,supra note 1, at A-6. Ms. Washington's attorney
advised her that it would cost more than the $4000 kept by the Volusia County Sheriff's
Office to challenge the seizure in court. Id. at A-6.
U.S. Representative Corrine Brown, an African-American Democrat from North
Florida who was present during Ms. Washington's testimony, commented:
Ijust don't see why I have to justify why I have cash money in my possession.
You have to understand, . . . it is not uncommon for the people I come in
contact with to deal in cash money. It's a cultural thing .... And if you're
not in that culture, you may not understand that.
Berry & Brazil, FBI, supra note 1, at A-4.
Ms. Washington's settlement agreement was signed by Melvin Stack, "Attorney for
County," Selena Washington, and Michael H. Blacker, "Attorney for Respondent(s),"
and provides:
1. This Agreement is made between the COUNTY OF VOLUSIA
(hereinafter called COUNTY) and SELINA [sic] WASHINGTON and
JONATHAN WASHINGTON, (hereinafter called OWNER(s)).
2. The COUNTY and OWNER(s) acknowledge the benefits to each party by
avoiding litigation and enter into this Agreement for the sole purpose of
avoiding litigation.
3. The property that is the subject of this action is $19,000.00 U.S.
currency.
4. COUNTY agrees to give possession of $15,000.00 to OWNER [sic].
5. OWNER(s) agree to give possession of $4,000.00 to COUNTY for
placement in the Forfeiture Trust Fund.
6. OWNER(s) certify that they are legally entitled to possession of the above
described currency.
7. OWNER(s) certify that they are freely and voluntarily entering into this
Agreement and fully acknowledge the terms of said Agreement.
8. OWNER(s) fully acknowledge that this Agreement has no bearing
whatsoever with [sic] the outcome of any criminal case that may have been
filed as a result of the seizure of the property listed above.
9. OWNER(s) represent to COUNTY that all statements in this Agreement
are true and further agree to hold harmless and indemnify the County or any
of its employees, agents or servants from any and all damage, actions, suits,
claims or demands of whatsoever kind, made by or on behalf of any person as
a result of COUNTY giving possession of the described currency to
OWNER(s) including but not limited to reasonable attorney's fees, travel and
investigation expenses caused by said damage, actions, suits, claims or
demands.
10. OWNER(s) agree to hold harmless the County or any of the County's
agents for the actions surrounding this seizure of the aforementioned property
and if applicable the arrest of OVNER(s) of said property.
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$19,000

had been paid.?32 Several

County

Council

members

"acknowledged a tax increase might be needed to pay off a large

judgment. "2
In February 1994, petitions were circulated to change the Volusia

County Charter.?

The Volusia County Charter requires the sheriff,

also the Director of the Department of Public Safety, to be elected. 5
The sheriff reports to the County Manager and the County Council.?
The petitions sought to amend the charter to make the sheriff a
constitutional officer, accountable only to voters? 7 The backers of the
petition "insist the sheriff should have the autonomy to run his department
without interference from outside administrators." 8 Sheriff Vogel
personally delivered 2676 petitions to the county elections office?239

About 10,000 petitions are required to place the proposed charter
amendment on the November 1994 ballot.?

Sheriff Vogel's critics,

who claimed that the proposed amendment would give the sheriff too
much power,ul eventually won the battle. After Vogel's supporters
came up with 11,000 signatures, a judge struck down the referendum
232. See Fontenay, Volusia FearsCosts, supra note 1, at B-i; see also Fontenay,
Tax Increase, supra note 1, at B-3.
233. Fontenay, Tax Increase, supra note 1, at B-3.
234. See Gary Davidson, SheriffDrops off Petition to County, DAYTONA BEACH
NmVs-J., Feb. 9, 1994, at 1-B.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.; see also Changes Would Impede Volusia 's Direction, DAYTONA BEACH
SUNDAY NEws-J., Feb. 20, 1994, at B-1 (editorial):
Under [the proposal, Sheriff Vogel] would not have to coordinate his budget
with the rest of the county, his employees would not have county civil service
protection, and he would take over the county's other public safety operations
(except for jail operations).
Volusia County's current system not only protects employees but forces
the sheriff to coordinate his budget with the rest of county government ....
Sheriff Vogel has shown himself to be an energetic lawman without such
new powers. The current setup merely provides for checks and balances as
well as coordination with the rest of county government, regardless of who
holds the office.
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because it unlawfully sought to repeal a "substantial portion" of the
charter. 2
More newspaper articles critical of Vogel were published during the
petition drive. Two Volusia County Sheriff's deputies told reporters that
Sheriff Vogel instructed the Selective Enforcement Team to target
minorities.'
Speaking out publicly against the head of a law
enforcement agency is highly unusual for law enforcement officers. One
of the deputies, a former member of the Selective Enforcement Team and
a thirteen-year veteran of the Volusia County Sheriff's Office, stated:
"Sheriff Vogel advised members of the team to look for blacks and
Hispanics ... ."2 The second deputy, also a former member of the
Selective Enforcement Team stated, "I concur with [the first deputy] . .
. . That definitely did happen. He's not making that up."'
Sheriff

Vogel denied that he instructed Volusia County deputies to target
242. Purvette A. Bryant, Judge: No Vote on Vogel, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 9,
1994, at C-3. Thejudge, Robert Rawlins, found that the petition was offered under the
"guise" of an amendment and that the petition and its title, "We Want Our Sheriff
Back," were vague, deceptive and misleading. Id. Vogel characterized the ruling as
a sad day for Volusia County residents. Id.
243. See Steve Berry & Pat LaMee, Vogel Squad ControversyHeats Up, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Feb. 18, 1994, at C-1; Steve Berry & Mary Murphy, 2nd Volusia Deputy
Says Vogel OrderedMinorities Targeted, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 19, 1994, at A-1
[hereinafter Berry & Murphy, Minorities Targeted];Pat LaMee, New Charges of Bias
Arise in Volusia Flap, ORLANDO SEiTINEL, Feb. 17, 1994, at C-1; Mary Murphy, Drug
Team: We Act Legally, Effectively, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 20, 1994, at B-1
[hereinafter Murphy, Drug Team].
244. Berry & Murphy, MinoritiesTargeted, supranote 243, at A-7. In an affidavit,
Frank Josenhans, the first deputy,
describes how he once followed a dark-colored Bronco or Blazer carrying two
black men. Although it was not speeding, weaving or breaking any laws,
Deputy Bobby Jones pulled the car over, [and] searched it....
Josenhans said he told Garcia [the second deputy] about the incident and
then confronted Jones.
"I was later verbally reprimanded by Sgt. (Dale) Anderson for questioning
his men's stops."
Id. In the same affidavit, Josenhans claims that Sheriff Vogel instructed the Selective
Enforcement Team to look for "blacks and Hispanics, gave an age frame, advised them
to look for rental cars and vehicles bearing South Florida, Georgia, South Carolina and
North Carolina tags." Murphy, Drug Team, supra note 243, at B-8. Sergeant Jones,
the leader of the Selective Enforcement Team, denies the allegations of the two deputies.
"We have never been ordered to ... nor have we ever targeted blacks, minorities or
anyone other than lawbreakers .... ." Id. at B-1.
245. See Berry & Murphy, Minorities Targeted, supranote 243, at A-1.
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minorities. "Idon't direct deputies to stop anyone based on race or ethnic
background."'
Also in February 1994, a black police officer who worked in
neighboring Seminole County told reporters that he was stopped in June
1990 by Volusia County Sheriff's deputies because he was black. u 7 The
deputy said: "I believe that the only reason I was stopped was because the
deputies who shined the light in my face saw I was a black man, and
because of my race, decided to pull me over."'
In Tallahassee, state legislators began working toward reforming the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. On the first day of the 1994 Florida

Regular Legislative Session, a state representative from Orlando
introduced a bill to amend the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.2 9

Thus, The Orlando Sentinel series of June 1992 led to the
investigation by Governor Chiles' panel and the ongoing FBI investigation.
As demonstrated by the February 1994 articles, Sheriff Vogel's actions
continue to be scrutinized by the newspaper.
V. CIVIL

RIGHTS

LAWSUITs

FILED BY MINORITY

MoTORIsTs

As explained above, two civil rights lawsuits were filed in 1993 in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida against
Sheriff Vogel and Volusia County. The first was filed by Aubrey
Duncan, an African-American.
A Volusia County Sheriff's deputy
246. Steve Moore, Deputy: DrugStops TargetMinorities, DAYTONABEACH NEWSJ., Feb. 17, 1994, at 1A, 22A (quoting Sheriff Vogel as saying: "I have never, and will
never, direct a deputy sheriff, or any other individual, to disobey the Constitution and
laws of the state of Florida that I am sworn to uphold.").
247. Steve Berry, Officer's Statement Tells of 'Racially Motivated' 1-95 Stop,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 26, 1994, at D-3:
Wynn [the black officer] said a Volusia deputy's cruiser was parked in the
median, shining its lights across the highway and into his face as he passed.
Wynn said the deputy did not give him any reason for the stop and let him
go when he saw Wynn's badge.
"Ifthe guys are just doing their job, that's one thing. ... But if they are
targeting minorities, that's something we all should have a problem with."
Id.
248. Id.
249. Steve Berry, Police Cash SeizuresHeadforStateDebate, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Feb. 9, 1994, at D-1; see supra Part II.C. (discussing the proposed amendments to the
Florida Act).
250. See Complaint, Duncan v. Volusia County, No. 93-478-CIV-ORL-22 (M.D.
Fla. filed June 18, 1993); see also Brazil, Driver Sues, supra note 220, at B-1.

NEW YORK L4W SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

had seized $265,000 from Duncan.25'

(Vol. 39

Duncan's lawsuit was set for a

jury trial in the trial term beginning on December 1, 1994,1 but the
court dismissed the case and Duncan is appealing the decision. 3 The
second was a class action filed by Selena Washington and the
NAACP.5'
Jorge Nater, a Puerto Rican from whom the Volusia
County Sheriff's deputy had seized $36,990, joined as a plaintiff in the
class action.'
The trial began in early January 1995 and was dismissed

five days later.5 6

A class action filed in the United States District Court for the District

of Colorado may also give some indication of the results which may be
reached in future civil rights cases cases. In Whiyeld v. Board of County
Commissioners of Eagle County, 7 seven named plaintiffs, as
representatives of the class, sued the Board of County Commissioners,
Sheriff A.J. Johnson, and various former and current sheriff's
officers." 8 Five of the named plaintiffs were black and one of the

named plaintiffs was "a young white male with hair longer than shoulder
length."'° The race of the other named plaintiff was not apparent from
the reported opinions."
Between May and December 1988, the plaintiffs were stopped by the

High Country Drug Task Force, "a multi-agency team led by the Eagle
County Sheriff's office with the mission of intercepting drug traffickers

along Interstate Highway 70. "
The plaintiffs alleged that they were
stopped solely on the basis of a drug courier profile that included the
following elements: (1) rental vehicles; (2) vehicles owned by persons not
in the vehicle; (3) vehicles with out-of-state license plates; (4) darkened
251. See Brazil, Driver Sues, supra note 220, at B-1.
252. See Pretrial Procedure and Scheduling Order at 1, Duncan v. Volusia County,
No. 93-478-CIV-ORL-22 (M.D. Fla. order filed Nov. 24, 1993).
253. See supra note 221.
254. See Complaint, Washington v. Vogel, No. 93-482-CIV-ORL-18 (M.D. Fla.
filed June 18, 1993) (on later pleadings the case number is shown as "No. 93-482-CIVORL-22").
255. See Berry, Puerto Rican Joins Suit, supra note 225, at B-3.
256. See Berry, Judge Throws out Suit, supra note 224, at A-i, A-11.
257. 837 F. Supp. 338 (D. Colo. 1993).
258. Id. at 340.
259. Id., at 340 n.2 (identifying Jhenita Whitfield, Janice Whitfield, Byron
Boudreaux, Aguinaldo Ferriera and Scan Verne as black).
260. United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332, 336 (D. Colo. 1990).
261. The other named plaintiff is Chad Demoss. There is no identification of his
race in either Whitfield or Laymon.
262. Whitfield, 837 F. Supp. at 340.
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windows or curtains; (5) temporary CB antennas; (6) radar detectors; (7)
structural modifications; (8) welding burns; (9) absence of luggage; (10)
air fresheners; (11) fast food wrappers on the floor; (12) and loose screws
in the trim or lying on the floor.'
In addition, the court noted that
"there is no dispute that race was a consideration.
The case came before the district court judge on the plaintiffs' motion
for partial summary judgment as to whether the Task Force's policy of
stopping motorists solely on the basis of the drug courier profile was
constitutional.'
The judge first reviewed the above elements and
concluded that only half of them could even have been used as a basis for
the initial stop of the vehicles. The factors that the officers could have
observed as the cars passed were: race of occupants, rental vehicles
(observable in some instances), vehicles with out-of-state tags, darkened
windows or curtains, temporary CB antennas, and radar detectors.'
Applying United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,'7 the district court ruled
that "race... is wholly inappropriate to define a class of suspects."'
Without particularization as to specific person, transaction or
incident, the naked inference would be that race correlates to
criminal behavior. Such an equation of race with suspicious
criminal activity would be nothing more than a racist assumption,
and I have previously held that "profile stops may not be
predicated on unconstitutional discrimination based on race,
ethnicity or state of residence."'
Examining the other factors, the district judge found that none of them
described anything out of the ordinary.'
The judge held that highway
stops made on the basis of a drug courier profile alone violated the Fourth
Amendment.Y
263. Id.
264. Id. (footnote omitted).

265. Id. at 341.
266. Id. at 343.
267. 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (holding that race alone did not provide the reasonable
suspicion needed for an investigatory stop when a roving border patrol stopped suspects

solely on the basis of their observed Mexican ancestry).
268. Whifield, 837 F. Supp. at 344.
269. Id. (quoting Laymon, 730 F. Supp. at 339).

270. Id.
271. Id.
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The judge also considered the defendants' motion for summary
judgment based upon the doctrine of qualified immunity.'
Qualified
immunity "shields government officials from civil liability provided their
alleged conduct does not violate clearly established law of which a
reasonable person would have known."'n The judge denied the motion
holding that "the plaintiffs have put forward evidence that, in instances
where the defendants stopped them based on the indicators [of the drug
courier profile] alone, clearly established law was violated."' 7 4
Although ending with opposite results, Duncan,' Washington276
and Whisteld are useful in this forward-looking analysis because in each
case the plaintiffs alleged that the highway stops were made based on race.
In Whipeld and Duncan, the plaintiffs claim that race was one of the
factors of the drug courier profile used to make the stop.'
Although
Ms. Washington does not claim a drug courier profile was used to stop
her, a number of the common factors of the Vogel drug courier profiles
were observable.'
She and her companion are African-American, they
were traveling on 1-95 at 3:15 a.m., and the car was from South
Carolina. 7
Whitfield differs from Duncan and Washington because the Whi~feld
case involved highway stops made solely on the basis of a drug courier
profile.'
In contrast, the officers who stopped Mr. Duncan, Ms.
Washington, and Mr. Nater claimed the stops were made because of
272. See id. at 344-46. In addition, the judge considered the defendants' claim that
summary judgment should be granted in favor of the Board of County Commissioners
because stopping motorists solely on the basis of the drug courier profile was not a
county policy. The judge denied the motion for summary judgment as to the Board of
County Commissioners because there was a genuine issue of material fact whether there
was a policy of stopping motorists only on the basis of the drug courier profile. Id. at

346.
273. Id. at 345.
274. Id. at 346.
275. Duncan v. Volusia County, No. 93-478-CIV-ORL-22 (M.D. Fla. filed June
18, 1993).
276. Washington v. Vogel, No. 93-482-CIV-ORL-18 (M.D. Fla. filed June 18,
1993) (on later pleadings the case number is shown as "No. 93-482-CIV-ORL-22").
277. Whitleld, 837 F. Supp. at 340; Complaint at 3, Duncan v. Volusia County,
No. 93-478-CIV-OR.-22 (M.D. Fla. filed June 18, 1993).
278. See Brazil & Berry, Deputies Take $19,000, supra note 1, at A-16.
279. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
280. Whie/d, 837 F. Supp. at 341 & nn.4-5.
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traffic violations. Mr. Duncan was stopped for weaving within his
lane . 1 Ms. Washington was stopped for driving seven miles over the
speed limit.2
Mr. Nater was stopped for following too closely.'
The Duncan and Washington plaintiffs would probably characterize
"weaving," "driving seven miles over the speed limit," and "following too
closely" as minor traffic violations. Presumably, the officers maldng the
stops would characterize the same acts as traffic violations for which a
reasonable officer would have made stops.
Duncan and Washington were resolved rather summarily after several
years of newspaper scrutiny, criticism, and investigation of Sheriff
Vogel's allegedly race-based targeting of 1-95 motorists, and both suits
failed. However, future plaintiffs may be able to use some of the data
gathered by The Orlando Sentinel reporters to their advantage.
Such a case is pending. Evans v. Vogel' is a suit by two minority
motorists who were stopped by the Selective Enforcement Team on I95.'
Victor Jerome Evans, an African-American, was a passenger in
a car driven by another African-American when the car was stopped for
a minor traffic violation on May 30, 1991.'
No citation was
issued.' The officer detained Evans and the other occupants of the car
and searched the vehicle, 25 finding $5000 on Evans' person.'
The
officer confiscated the cash, believing it to be drug money.'
The
investigating officer said: "Evans and his companions acted suspiciously,
281. See Complaint at 3, Duncan v. Volusia County, No. 93-478-CIV-ORL-22
(M.D. Fla. filed June 18, 1993). The defendants claimed that Mr. Duncan was stopped
"for a traffic infraction (i.e., crossing the center lane, causing another vehicle to swerve
to avoid collision) which constituted a violation for which any reasonable law
enforcement officer would have stopped the offending vehicle." Answer and Affirmative
Defenses at 3, Duncan v. Volusia County, No. 93-478-CIV-ORL-22 (M.D. Fla. filed
June 18, 1993).
282. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
283. See supranote 7.
284. Evansv. Vogel, No. 94-962-CIV-ORL-22 (M.D. Fla. filed Sept. 7, 1994); see
Steve Berry, Another Suit Filed over 1-95 Stops, ORLANDo SENTINBL, Sept. 8, 1994, at
C-3 [hereinafter Berry, Another Suit Filed].
285. Complaint, Evans v. Vogel, No. 94-962-CIV-ORL-22 (M.D. Fla. filed Sept.
7, 1994).
286. Id. at 2-3.
287. Id. at 3.
288. Id.
289. Berry, Another Suit Filed, supranote 284, at C-3. Vogel returned $3000 to
Evans three months after the stop, after Evans' attorney protested. Id.
290. Id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

by showing excessive nervousness, telling inconsistent stories and not
having enough clothing in the car for an overnight trip. " "
Francisco Javier Muriel, who is Hispanic, was stopped for a minor
traffic violation on February 4, 1991.1 Even though he was not issued
a traffic citation, the officer detained him and searched his vehicle.'
No cash was confiscated.'
Both plaintiffs are suing Sheriff Vogel and Volusia County under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, alleging that the county's search-and-seizure
policies discriminate against African-American and Hispanic motorists and
that stops are based on an unconstitutional race-based drug courier
profile. 5 The plaintiffs seek an injunction and compensatory and
punitive damages' and certification as a class action to represent all
African-Americans and Hispanics who were stopped and searched on 1-95
without being arrested.'
Evans' suit mirrors Washington and Nater's, which was dismissed.
It thus appears likely that courts will reject Evans and Muriel's allegations
as well. This strengthens the conclusion that the legislature must act to
reform Florida's civil forfeiture laws if minority motorists' rights are to
be protected on Interstate 95 in Volusia County.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The federal and Florida forfeiture statutes were designed at least in
part to take the cash profits out of illegal drug trafficldng. Unfortunately,
the broad wording of the statutes has allowed at least one Florida sheriff
to seize cash from apparently innocent minority motorists.
Newspaper coverage has at times given hope that either the legislative
or the judicial branch would step in and give the minority motorist needed
protection. A review of newspaper articles since June 1992 tracks a
continuing criticism of Sheriff Vogel's use of the Florida Contraband
Forfeiture Act to seize cash from 1-95 motorists. Like a wild fire
spreading, the protest against Sheriff Vogel's tactics has moved
spontaneously from one location to the next. The protest has gone from
the local level, to the Florida governor, to federal court, to Capitol Hill,
291. Id.
292. Complaint at 3, Evans v. Vogel, No. 94-962-CIV-ORL-22 (M.D. Fla. filed
Sept. 7, 1994).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 2.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 3-4.
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to the Department of Justice, and back to the Florida legislature and the
local level. At each location, the protest burned bright briefly and then
seemed to be extinguished.
Unaccountably, the protest has yet to result in any additional
protection for the minority motorist. The federal and Florida courts thus
far have been unwilling to afford minority motorists preseizure protection.
Congress and the Florida Legislature have failed to even propose
preseizure protection for the minority motorist.
Some additional
protection may come either as a result of the FBI and Department of
Justice investigations or as a result of the pending civil rights actions.

